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Screening Competition in Mobile Telephony ∗
Lukasz Grzybowski†
Abstract
This paper presents a simple method for screening competition in differentiated products
oligopoly with a small number of competitors. In many situations, estimation of price elas-
ticities of demand may be impossible due to difficulties in defining demand or missing data
on sales. However, even without information on price elasticities, in certain situations it is
possible to test for the static non-cooperative Nash-Bertrand equilibrium, which in the case
of rejection, may be important screening information for antitrust authorities. The static
non-cooperative Nash-Bertrand equilibrium may be rejected when demand is linear and in
the estimation of best-response functions, the coefficients on the competitors’ prices are sta-
tistically greater than 0.5. The application of this method is illustrated by the example of
German mobile telephony using monthly data between January 1998 and December 2002.
According to the estimation results, the observed prices in the segment of low-users cannot
be the outcome of a static non-cooperative Nash-Bertrand equilibrium.
Keywords: collusion; best-response functions; mobile telephony.
JEL Classification: L13, L41, L96.
∗The opinions expressed in this article reflect only the author’s view and in no way bind the institution to
which he is affiliated.
†Competition Commission, Victoria House, Southampton Row, London, WC1B 4AD. E-mail:
lukasz@mushroomski.com.
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1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with competition in the mobile telecommunications industry. A simple
method for testing static non-cooperative Nash-Bertrand equilibrium is presented and applied
to mobile telecommunications industry in Germany using monthly data between January 1998
and December 2002.
In general, mobile telecommunications industries are oligopolies with a small number of
competitors and institutionally regulated entry. Mobile telephony seems to be also characterized
by other necessary and important ingredients for collusion to be sustainable (see Rey (2000)).
Firms interact frequently and may react quickly to changes in competitors’ prices, i.e. a new tariff
may be marketed within a very short period of time, probably even a month. The innovation,
which is observed in mobile telecommunications industry, such as the introduction of pre-paid
cards, SMS, MMS, etc. can be very quickly imitated by competitors. Furthermore, there are
structural links between network operators, because they have to sign bilateral interconnection
agreements. In many countries we may also observe symmetry of market shares. However, the
asymmetry of shares is not uncommon and network operators may significantly differ in cost
structure, which may disturb incentives for collusion.1 Because of these structural characteristics
the mobile telecommunications industry is perceived as an industry in which tacit or explicit
collusion may be suspected.2
Detection of collusion and cartels is one of the critical issues in antitrust and there is an
overwhelming number of theoretical and empirical studies on this subject. This paper presents
a simple method for testing static non-cooperative Nash-Bertrand equilibrium. It is based on
a stylized framework for differentiated products competition with linear demand functions and
uses market level data.3 When there is a change from competition to collusion, the slopes of
1Other factors which influence incentives to collude are: market transparency, product differentiation, demand
growth and fluctuations, buying power of consumers, multimarket contacts, network effects, etc.
2In France, for instance, the Competition Authority found written evidence on information sharing and on
market shares fixing agreement. The Competition Authorities in Spain and Ireland found collective dominance
in their mobile telecommunications industries.
3Since competition and collusion are not contrasted directly this method may be classified as screening, see
discussion in Harrington (2005).
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best-response functions become steeper and the intercepts move towards the origin. The non-
cooperative Nash-Bertrand best-response functions should not in general be too steep and, in
particular, their slopes cannot be greater than 0.5. When firms jointly maximize their profits,
in certain situations, best-response functions may have slopes greater than 0.5.4 Therefore,
when in the estimation of best-response functions the coefficients of competitors’ prices are
statistically greater than 0.5, one may state that the observed prices do not result from the
static non-cooperative Nash-Bertrand equilibrium. Importantly, this framework does not require
estimation of price elasticities of demand, which in many situations may be impossible due to
difficulties in defining demand or missing data on sales. If information on diversion ratios is
not available and the estimates of the coefficients on competitors’ prices are smaller than 0.5,
static non-cooperative Nash-Bertrand equilibrium cannot be rejected. However, if it is possible
to estimate demand functions or get information on diversion ratios from elsewhere, a particular
market equilibrium could be tested. This method is then an alternative to the estimation of a
structural model of demand and supply.
The application of this method is illustrated on the case of mobile telephony in Germany using
monthly data between January 1998 and December 2002. According to the estimation results
of the best-response functions, the observed prices cannot result from a static non-cooperative
Nash-Bertrand equilibrium.5
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review.
Section 3 introduces the empirical framework. Section 4 provides an overview of the German
mobile telephony and presents the data and estimation results. Section 5 contains the conclu-
sions.
4This method is applicable to markets with a small number of competitors, in which demand is well approx-
imated by a linear function. It should be possible to estimate best-response functions in these markets and the
diversion ratios for some products must take particularly large values, i.e. products of colluding firms must be
relatively close substitutes.
5The German Competition Authority has not raised any concerns regarding competition in mobile telecom-
munications industry.
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2 Literature Review
This paper refers to studies on competition in the mobile telecommunications industry and
detection of cartels. There is a large body of literature on estimation of demand for telecom-
munications services but studies which assess the degree of competition either by estimating
structural models of demand and supply or in other ways are rather scarce. For instance,
Grzybowski and Pareira (2007) estimate nested logit demand for aggregate data and simulate
a merger in mobile telephony in Portugal. Kim (2006) uses aggregate data on Korean mobile
telecommunications industry to estimate a dynamic structural model of switching decisions be-
tween tariff plans and network operators. She finds that the magnitude of switching costs varies
across networks and that a change in the variety of optional plans and plan characteristics play
a role in the consumer switching decision.
Recent reviews of economic research on the detection of cartels may be found in Porter (2005)
and Harrington (2005). In general, collusion may be detected if there are structural breaks in
the market data. For instance, sharp changes in the price cannot be typically explained by
changes in cost and demand. They are inconsistent with competitive theory but consistent with
theories of collusive pricing under imperfect monitoring (see Green and Porter (1984)).
According to Harrington (2005) the empirical methods for cartel detection may be classified
as screening and verification methods. Screening methods provide evidence that firms do not
behave competitively but do not provide evidence of collusion. Verification methods directly
contrast competition and collusion as alternative explanations for the observed behavior of
firms. There is a large body of empirical studies of both types. In particular, screening methods
were developed and applied for empirical analyses of procurement auctions. These studies
commonly estimate reduced form bidding equations by regressing price on cost and demand
shifters. Bidding equations for suspected cartel members should be statistically different from
bidding equations for non-colluding firms. Afterwards, one may check whether bidding by non-
colluding firms is consistent with a competitive model and bidding behavior of colluding firms
is consistent with a model of collusion. Examples of such studies are: Porter and Zona (1993)
on the procurement auctions for high-way-paving jobs, Porter and Zona (1999) for school milk,
Bajari and Ye (2003) for seal coating.
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Many other studies, reviewed in Harrington (2005), try to screen industries for the presence
of cartels by analyzing the patterns of prices and market shares. In particular, under certain
conditions, the variance of price is lower for collusion. Abrantes-Metz et al (2005) develop a
screening method in terms of price variance. Moreover, parallel price movements are commonly
perceived as a collusive marker, which, however, may not be true, as illustrated by Buccirossi
(2006).
The literature mentioned above and others suggests that detecting collusion is very difficult.
The empirical methods at hand are data demanding and often limited.
3 Empirical Model
A differentiated products industry is considered, in which firms strategically choose prices and
play static Nash-Bertrand game. The profits of a single product firm j in period t may be
written as:
Πjt(pjt, p−jt) = (pjt −mcjt)Djt(pjt, p−jt)− Fjt, (1)
where pjt represents price, mcjt is marginal cost, Djt(.) is the demand, Fjt represents fixed cost
of firm j and p−jt is a vector of prices of competitors.6 The first order condition may be written
as:
Djt(pjt, p−jt) + (pjt −mcjt)∂Djt(pjt, p−jt)
∂pjt
= 0. (2)
Demand functions are assumed to be linear:
Djt(pjt, p−jt) = ajt +
J∑
k=1
bjkpkt, (3)
for which ∂Djt(pjt,p−jt)∂pkt = bjk. For given demand function, the system of FOCs (3) may be
written as a system of j Nash-Bertrand best-response functions in the form:
pjt = − ajt2bjj +
mcjt
2
− 1
2bjj
∑
k 6=j
bjkpkt, (4)
6If the price elasticities may be estimated in a trustable way, the main problem remains lack of information
on marginal costs. However, when the determinants of marginal costs are observed, markups may be estimated
and a collusive market conduct can be tested against the competitive one (for a literature review and discussion
see Bresnahan (1987) and Reiss and Wolak (2006)).
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In the case of an industry in which some firms collude, the best-response functions for colluding
firms may be written as:
pjt = − ajt2bjj +
mcjt
2
− 1
2bjj
∑
k∈cartel
(bjk + bkj)pkt − 12bjj
∑
k*cartel
bjkpkt +
1
2bjj
∑
k∈cartel
bkjmckt, (5)
while the best-responses for non-colluding firms are given by equation (4). Once, firms start
colluding, their best-response functions become steeper and the intercepts move towards the
origin.
The coefficients of the competitors’ prices bjk2bjj in the non-cooperative best-response equation
(4) represent a diversion ratio divided by 2, which in theory must be smaller than 0.5.7 For an
industry with a small number of competitors it should be possible to estimate a system of best-
response functions given by (4) or (5), or a mixture of these two. If the coefficient of the prices
of competitors is statistically greater than 0.5, then a static non-cooperative Nash-Bertrand
equilibrium may be rejected. Thus, observed prices can be generated by the steeper cooperative
best-response functions given by equation (5).
Mobile telecommunications services are commonly perceived as horizontally differentiated
products. Empirical studies typically model demand for mobile access using discrete choice
framework. In this study, a stylized linear differentiated products demand functions are used.
The assumption of the functional form of demand is critical for the validity of the test. It is
responsible for the appearance of a 2 in the denominators of equations (4) and (5), which results
in a boundary value for the estimates of coefficients on competitors’ prices, based on which
competition and collusion may be distinguished. The consequence of the assumption of the
functional form of demand on testing for market power in homogenous products framework is
discussed by Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983). They show that a monopolist facing a linear demand
curve will pass to consumers 50% of cost changes, while in general pass through rates can be
higher or lower depending on the shape of the demand curve. The other underlying assumption
is that cross-price effects are smaller than own-price effects, which is a common premise in
theoretical models.
7As in Shapiro (1996), diversion ratio from product A to product B is the fraction of sales lost by product A
which is captured by product B due to a price increase of product A. It may be also interpreted as the proportion
of people buying product A who consider product B as their second choice.
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4 Empirical Implementation
4.1 Mobile Telephony in Germany
In 1992, Telecom Mobilnet and Mannesmann Mobilfunk started to provide mobile telecommuni-
cations services in Germany using digital networks. The first one was a subsidiary of state-owned
telecommunications incumbent Deutsche Telekom, which was later privatized and transformed
into T-Mobile. The second one was a private company, which was later taken over by Vodafone.
In 1993 a third license was granted to E-plus, which began to provide mobile telecommunications
services one year later. Another license was granted in 1997 to Viag Interkom (later called O2)
which started providing mobile telecommunications services in November 1998.
In 2000, six companies received licenses to develop UMTS networks: Group 3G (Quam), T-
Mobil, Mannesmann-Vodafone, Auditorium, Mobilcom Multimedia and O2.8 One of the license
winners, Quam, entered the market in November 2001 by signing roaming agreements with
active network operators. It acquired about 200,000 consumers but subsequently went bankrupt
one year later.
Network operators may sell services to consumers directly or indirectly through independent
service providers (ISPs). In general an ISP resells airtime on a third party’s mobile telecommu-
nications network by providing billing and customer care services under its own brand name.
In Germany network operators can commercially decide whether to sign an ISP agreement. Ac-
cording to the German Telecommunications Act the agreements between network operators and
ISPs have to be non-discriminatory and assure fair competition between retailers. Typically, the
tariffs offered by ISPs reflect tariffs of the network carriers.
In 2003, there were four network operators – T-Mobile, D2 Vodafone, E-Plus and O2 – and
about twelve ISPs. Only O2 did not reach any agreement with ISPs. Out of these firms,
only eight had significant market shares – network operators: T-Mobil (29.9%), D2 Voda-
fone (27.7%), E-Plus (9.3%), O2 (6.3%) and ISPs: Debitel (12.7%), Mobilcom (6.5%), Talkline
(3.2%), Drillisch (2.4%). The remaining ISPs accounted for only about 2.0% of subscribers.9 Be-
8This technology allows data to be transferred at much higher rates in order to satisfy the demands of multi-
media applications.
9Source: www.RegTP.de
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cause of the market structure and pricing dependence, it is assumed that only network operators
compete with each other.
4.2 Data
The estimation of best-response functions requires data on firm-specific prices, marginal costs
and demand factors, as given by equations (4) and (5). Such a detailed firm-level information is
not available publicly. The Federal Statistical Office (FSO) in Germany provides separate CPI
indices for fixed line and mobile telephony. Four different price indices are computed for mobile
telecommunications services – three different user profiles: infrequent, average and frequent
users, and an aggregate index.
Firm-specific price indices used in this study are computed based on user profile method-
ology, which is similar to the one used by the FSO (see Beuerlein (2000).10 Tariff information
for Germany was collected from the price listings published in telecommunications magazine
“Connect” and on the Internet in the time period January 1998 – December 2002. The price
indices are computed for a consumer who uses mobile telecommunications services infrequently
so that he is interested in purchasing a pre-paid tariff rather than a contract. The number and
length of phone calls, as well as distribution of calls among destination networks and time-zones
are randomized. Moreover, the simulation accounts for price discrimination between on-net and
off-net calls.
The following algorithm is used for the calculation of firm-specific price indices. An infrequent
mobile telephony user is assumed to make on average 15 calls per month (uniform distribution
from the interval [10,20]). An average length of a call is 2 minutes (Poisson distribution with
λ = 20 seconds multiplied by 6). The distribution among destination networks is proportional
to the market shares. The peak time is assumed to be the same for all tariffs, between 8am and
8pm on weekdays. The distributions over days and hours of the day are uniform. Then, for
the first draw, for all tariffs available on the market in a given month, the expected bill value
10A similar approach was also used by the Irish Commission for Communications Regulation in its analysis of
wholesale mobile access and call origination. This analysis was a basis for the assessment of collective dominance in
mobile telecommunications industry in Ireland. See Commission for Communications Regulation (2004) “Market
Analysis - Wholesale Mobile Access and Call Origination.”
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is computed. The simulation of monthly calls is repeated 1000 times and an average bill value
is calculated. The cheapest tariffs offered by each firm constitute firm-specific price indices (see
Figure (1)).
Figure 1:
10
15
20
Eu
ro
/m
on
th
1998m1 1999m7 2001m1 2002m7
T−Mobile Vodafone
E−plus O2
Germany 1998−2002
Low−end prices for mobile services:
The FSO provides also country-level information on potential marginal cost factors, such as
the cost of labor, capital and electronic equipment (see Table (1)), which are used as exogenous
explanatory variables in the regression of best-response functions. Moreover, the time trend
may be a component of the cost function and could be interpreted as technological innovation.
As described in the previous section, two market entries took place in the time period of this
analysis. The first one, of O2, took place in November 1998 and the second one, of Quam,
in November 2001. Prices of these firms are not used in the regressions but instead, the best-
response functions are allowed to react to entries through parallel shifts.11
11As can be seen on the Figure (1), prices of T-Mobile and Vodafone did not react to these entries, while E-plus
reacted by price decreases.
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Apart from cost determinants, the regressions should also include demand factors. Demand
for mobile telecommunications services may depend on the network quality, i.e. reception quality
and coverage. By January 1998 all three network operators: T-Mobile, Vodafone and E-plus were
on the market sufficiently long to provide coverage for the whole country area. Thus, it may be
expected that there were no significant changes in the network quality between January 1998 and
December 2002. Other important issues are handset subsidies and advertising. Unfortunately,
due to lack of data on these factors, they cannot be accounted for in this analysis. Potentially,
the improving quality of handsets may show up in the time trend as stimulating demand. On
the other hand, firms tend to reduce their subsidies over time, which may have a negative impact
on the demand.
A number of empirical studies suggest the presence of network effects in mobile telecom-
munications industry. The demand for mobile telecommunications services could be stimulated
by the number of current users. In particular, consumers may value to subscribe to a larger
network more than to a smaller one. Thus, lagged own network market shares are used in the
regressions as a proxy for firm-specific network effects. Since network effects are supposed to
stimulate demand, they should show up with a positive sign in the regressions of best-response
functions. Moreover, if there are high switching costs in mobile telecommunications industry,
greater market shares may induce firms to charge higher prices to exploit locked-in consumers.
The information on market shares in terms of subscriptions was provided by the Federal Network
Agency.
The best-response prices are regressed on the variables discussed above and the prices of
competitors, which are endogenous and require instrumental variables estimation method. The
exogenous explanatory variables from the model are used as instrumental variables. Cost factors
are commonly used instrumental variables for prices. Entries of O2 and Quam were regulated
and may be considered as exogenous. Price index for fixed line services is assumed to be
exogenous. Fixed line markets in Germany were liberalized on January 1st, 1998. There has
been an increasing number of entries and competition in the national and international markets,
in particular. Moreover, lagged penetrations for mobile telecommunications services in Germany
and dummies for third and fourth quarters are used as instruments. We also use the average
10
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price for mobile telecommunications services in France as an instrument for prices in Germany.12
Prices of mobile telecommunications services in France and Germany may follow a common trend
due to similarity of cost structures.
4.3 Estimation
Figure (1) shows that prices of mobile telecommunications services set by T-Mobile and Vodafone
are almost identical with correlation of 0.998. Only between January 2002 and April 2002 prices
differed by a negligible value. This means that these firms were able to form perfect conjectures
about the prices set by the competitor in the next month. They lowered prices exactly in the
same month and by the same value. The prices set by E-plus also match perfectly the prices of
competitors for most of the time but, in addition, E-plus reacted to entries of O2 and Quam by
lowering prices. The prices set by the entrant O2 also do not differ significantly from the prices
of competitors. The differences visible in prices of E-plus and O2 in the form of a parallel shift
upwards are partly due to differences in on-net and off-net prices and the distribution of calls
according to market shares.13
The observed parallelism and the coordination in lowering prices by T-Mobile and Voda-
fone looks suspicious and may potentially indicate coordination of strategies. However, based
on equation (4), one cannot exclude that identical prices result from a static non-cooperative
Nash-Bertrand game. We may observe that two networks set identical non-collusive prices when
demand factors, marginal costs, and own and cross-price elasticities with the other networks
are very similar. T-Mobile and Vodafone have almost identical market shares since the startup
of mobile telecommunications industry in Germany, which may be due to similar cost struc-
ture. The collusive best response prices given by equation (5) may be similar under the same
conditions.
Also, lack of reaction of T-Mobile and Vodafone to the entry of O2 and Quam does not allow
to distinguish collusive and non-collusive price setting. Entry has no effect on the best-response
12First, price indices for the network operators in France are computed in an analogous way as for Germany.
Then, industry-level price is constructed by weighting the individual prices by market shares.
13List prices in these periods may be the same for all four network operators but, for instance, in 2003, the
share of E-Plus was 14.3% and of O2 only 6.3%.
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function when it does not change own-price elasticity and the cross-price elasticity with the
entrant is close to zero, i.e. the diversion ratio is almost zero. Basically, a non-collusive entry
has the same effect on collusive and non-collusive prices. Therefore, in general, it is not possible
to distinguish between collusive and non-collusive best-response prices as long as information
on own and cross-price elasticities is not available.
The network operators T-Mobile, Vodafone and E-plus are numbered by 1,2 and 3, respec-
tively. Since the observed prices of T-Mobile and Vodafone are basically the same, we may
substitute p2t = p1t in the FOCs. In the case of competition we have a system of FOCs given
by equation (4). In the case of collusion among all three network operators we use equation (5).
When only T-Mobile and Vodafone collude and E-plus maximizes profits non-cooperatively we
have a system of equations (5) for the first two operators and equation (4) for E-plus.14 Thus,
in a general form, we have a following system of three equations to estimate:
p1t = α1x1t − β1p3t + ε1t
p2t = α2x2t − β2p3t + ε2t
p3t = α3x3t − β3p1t + ε3t
(6)
where xit are the vectors of demand and cost factors and εit represent normally distributed error
terms.15 The slopes in these three situations take the following values:
β1 = b132b11+b12 , β2 =
b23
2b22+b21
, β3 = b31b33 all compete;
β1 = b132(b11+b12) , β2 =
b23
2(b22+b21)
, β3 = b31b33 only T-Mobile and Vodafone collude;
β1 = b13+b312(b11+b12) , β2 =
b23+b32
2(b22+b21)
, β3 = b31+b13b33 all collude.
When demand functions are not estimated and information on diversion ratios is missing, it is
not possible to test which equilibrium fits best the data. However, as already discussed, if in the
estimation of best-response functions, some slopes on competitors’ prices are greater than 0.5,
14It is assumed that mobile network operators set their prices independently to the prices of fixed-line services.
In the case of a price increase by one network operators, the second choice would be almost certainly subscription
to another network. There are very few consumers who completely give up the usage of mobile telecommunications
services. Also the European Commission in a number of decisions has established that mobile telecommunications
services cannot be regarded as a substitute to fixed line telephony services.
15Given that p2t = p1t, the first two equations are the same. Nevertheless, both equations are estimated.
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then the cases of non-cooperative Nash-Bertrand equilibrium and collusion between T-Mobile
and Vodafone can be rejected.
The estimation results are presented in Table (2) for SURE estimation and in Table (3) for
GMM estimation. According to the Hausman J test the exogeneity of the prices of competitors
may be rejected. In the regression of prices of T-Mobile and Vodafone on the prices of E-plus,
the coefficients are significantly greater than 0.5, which rejects the static non-cooperative Nash-
Betrand equilibrium and the case of collusion between T-Mobile and Vodafone only. This may
be an important screening information for the German Competition Authority. In fact, these
coefficients should be smaller than 1. In all three regressions in Table (3) their equality to values
smaller than 1 cannot be rejected.
The regressions show some dependence of the best-response prices on the cost factors: the
cost of labor and electronic equipment, in the case of T-Mobile and Vodafone. Pricing by E-plus
seems not to be determined by the cost factors. There is even a negative dependence, which is
counterintuitive. Greater lagged market share leads to lower current period prices in the case
of T-Mobile and Vodafone, but higher for E-plus. The entry of Viag and Quam was basically
ignored by T-Mobile and Vodafone, while E-plus reacted with price decreases. Finally, prices of
fixed line services are insignificant in the GMM estimation and time trend is significant in the
case of T-Mobile and Vodafone.
5 Conclusions
This paper presents a simple method for testing static non-cooperative Nash-Bertrand equilib-
rium and illustrates its application to mobile telephony in Germany.
In many situations estimation of price elasticities of demand may be impossible due to
difficulties in defining demand or missing data on sales. However, even without information on
price elasticities, in certain situations it is possible to test for a static non-cooperative Nash-
Bertrand equilibrium.
When there is a change from competition to collusion and demand functions are linear, the
slopes of best-response functions become steeper and the intercepts move towards the origin.
The non-cooperative Nash-Bertrand best-response functions should not in general be too steep
13
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and, in particular, their slopes cannot be greater than 0.5. Therefore, if in the estimation of best-
response functions the coefficients on the competitors’ prices are statistically greater than 0.5,
it may be definitely stated that the observed prices do not result from a static non-cooperative
Nash-Bertrand equilibrium. Moreover, when it is possible to estimate demand functions or get
information on diversion ratios from elsewhere, a particular equilibrium can be tested. This
method is then an alternative to the estimation of a structural model of demand and supply.
The application of this method is illustrated on the example of German mobile telephony
using monthly data between January 1998 and December 2002. According to the estimation
results, observed prices for the segment of low-users cannot be the outcome of static non-
cooperative Nash-Bertrand equilibrium. This may be important market screening information
for the German Competition Authority.
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6 Appendix
Table 1: Simple Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std Min Max
price T-Mobile (Euro/100) 60 0.1656 0.035 0.126 0.213
price Vodafone (Euro/100) 60 0.1647 0.035 0.125 0.212
price E-plus (Euro/100) 60 0.1565 0.035 0.106 0.209
price fixed (index) 60 1.0741 0.129 0.958 1.297
electronic 60 0.9223 0.035 0.866 0.983
labor (index) 60 1.1808 0.044 1.097 1.263
lagged share T-Mobile 60 0.2306 0.123 0.064 0.393
lagged share Vodafone 60 0.2255 0.115 0.060 0.362
lagged share E-plus 60 0.0778 0.039 0.018 0.122
time 60 0.3050 0.174 0.010 0.600
Quam dummy 60 0.2166 0.415 0.000 1.000
Viag dummy 60 0.8500 0.360 0.000 1.000
avg.price Germany (Euro/100) 60 0.1623 0.034 0.121 0.211
avg.price France (Euro/100) 60 0.0629 0.013 0.042 0.089
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Table 2: Estimates of Best-Response Functions (SURE)
Variable Est. z P > |z| [95% Interval]
T-Mobile
price E-plus .931 6.56 0.000 [ .653, 1.210]
price fixed -.069 -1.81 0.070 [ -.144, .005]
Quam dummy .023 4.63 0.000 [ .013, .032]
Viag dummy .046 7.67 0.000 [ .034, .059]
lagged share -.094 -2.05 0.041 [ -.185, -.004]
time -.143 -2.01 0.045 [ -.283, -.003]
labor .679 5.02 0.000 [ .414, .945]
electronic .568 3.00 0.003 [ .197, .939]
intercept -1.196 -5.13 0.000 [-1.654, -.739]
Vodafone
price E-plus .949 6.65 0.000 [ .669, 1.229]
price fixed -.049 -1.25 0.211 [ -.127, .028]
Quam dummy .023 4.82 0.000 [ .014, .033]
Viag dummy .041 6.51 0.000 [ .028, .053]
lagged share -.095 -2.05 0.040 [ -.186, -.004]
time -.159 -2.30 0.022 [ -.295, -.023]
labor .742 5.38 0.000 [ .471, 1.013]
electronic .477 2.51 0.012 [ .104, .851]
intercept -1.207 -5.14 0.000 [-1.668, -.746]
E-plus
price Vodafone .540 6.14 0.000 [ .368, .713]
price fixed .068 2.18 0.029 [ .006, .129]
Quam dummy -.017 -4.20 0.000 [ -.024, -.009]
Viag dummy -.033 -6.72 0.000 [ -.043, -.024]
lagged share .094 0.65 0.516 [ -.190, .379]
time .049 0.80 0.425 [ -.071, .170]
labor -.357 -2.76 0.006 [ -.610, -.103]
electronic -.233 -1.49 0.136 [ -.539, .073]
intercept .630 3.06 0.002 [ .227, 1.034]
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Table 3: Estimates of Best-Response Functions (GMM): Equation by Equation
Variable Est. z P > |z| [95% Interval]
T-Mobile
price E-plus 1.202 7.36 0.000 [ .882,1.522]
price fixed -.055 -1.44 0.149 [ -.130, .019]
Quam dummy .028 4.48 0.000 [ .016, .041]
Viag dummy .052 10.48 0.000 [ .042, .062]
lagged share -.053 -1.05 0.296 [ -.153, .046]
time -.100 -1.42 0.156 [ -.238, .038]
labor .506 3.51 0.000 [ .224, .789]
electronic .489 2.83 0.005 [ .150, .828]
intercept -1.005 -4.06 0.000 [-1.491,-.520]
Hansen J test 22.82 0.001
Centered R2 0.93
Vodafone
price E-plus .871 4.48 0.000 [ .490,1.252]
price fixed -.013 -0.36 0.716 [ -.083, .057]
Quam dummy .022 4.06 0.000 [ .011, .033]
Viag dummy .035 6.36 0.000 [ .024, .045]
lagged share -.099 -2.19 0.028 [ -.187,-.010]
time -.133 -2.10 0.036 [ -.258,-.008]
labor .689 5.24 0.000 [ .431, .947]
electronic .429 2.65 0.008 [ .112, .746]
intercept -1.131 -5.16 0.000 [-1.560,-.701]
Hansen J test 23.23 0.001
Centered R2 0.95
E-plus
price Vodafone .464 3.72 0.000 [ .219, .709]
price fixed .040 1.12 0.261 [ -.030, .111]
Quam dummy -.020 -4.08 0.000 [ -.030,-.010]
Viag dummy -.033 -13.06 0.000 [ -.038,-.028]
lagged share -.052 -0.44 0.658 [ -.285, .179]
time .040 0.89 0.374 [ -.048, .129]
labor -.247 -1.99 0.046 [ -.491,-.003]
electronic -.178 -1.55 0.120 [ -.403, .046]
intercept .508 2.73 0.006 [ .143, .874]
Hansen J test 12.058 0.017
Centered R2 0.97
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